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In 2004, the Italian Parliament enacted a law regulating medically assisted reproduction. Although the law recog-
nizes as legal certain assisted reproduction techniques, several other procedures are implicitly or expressly banned:
oocyte and sperm donation, using embryos for the scientific research purposes and reproductive cloning. In this
article, I outline the new legal framework, pointing out some of the shortcomings of its provisions, such as the fail-
ure to define what an ‘embryo’ is, the contradictions between this law and the law on abortion, the opportunity for
Italian couples to circumvent some of the prohibitions by resorting to ‘reproductive tourism’, and the central role
that physicians play in the new legal framework.
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Celestine Bohlen (1995) noted that ‘Italy is virtually the only
country in Europe that still has no law, no controls, not even
any minimum regulations governing more than 100 private
clinics that perform various fertilization procedures’. The leg-
islative gap was eventually filled on February 19, 2004, when
the Italian Parliament enacted Law 40/2004, which regulates
medically assisted reproduction (MAR). Italian policymakers
adopted a rather conservative stand, legalizing only few
MAR techniques. This article analyses the recently enacted
Law 40/2004 on MAR and the 2004 Ministry of Health
Guidelines that integrate the legislation on the topic (Italian
Ministry of Health, 2004). First, I outline the key points of
the recently enacted provisions; second, I highlight some
aspects that have characterized the political debate surround-
ing the Parliament’s decision-making process.
MAR: admissible techniques
The new law regulates MAR techniques, which are ordinarily
intended as all techniques that favour ‘any form of non-coital
conception’ (Robertson, 1986). MAR techniques comprise
‘all procedures that imply the transfer of human oocytes,
sperm, and embryos for the purpose of inducing pregnancy’
in the patient. The Ministry of Health Guidelines categorize
MAR procedures into three levels based on complexity and
invasiveness. In selecting the appropriate procedure, the
treating physician gives priority to the technique that is the
least complex and invasive according to the following Minis-
try categorizations:
. Level I: Intrauterine insemination, intraperitoneal insemi-
nation, Fallopian tube sperm perfusion (FSP) and ovulation
induction;
. Level II: IVF, ICSI, percutaneous epididymal sperm
aspiration (PESA), frozen testicular biopsy of gametes,
intra-Fallopian transfer of gametes (GIFT), zygotes (ZIFT)
and embryos (TET);
. Level III: Micro-chirurgic testicular biopsy of gametes,
and laparoscopies to transfer gametes, zygotes and embryos.
For each group of treatments, the Guidelines indicate the
medical indications that suggest choosing a specific tech-
nique, and the technical and administrative procedures that
physicians must follow in treating the couple.
Oocyte and sperm donation is forbidden. Consequently,
couples who are unable to reproduce because one member of
the couple is infertile may not seek donation. Critics of the
2004 legislation have pointed out that oocyte and sperm
donations are legal in many European countries. In fact,
France, Great Britain, Spain, Greece and Belgium allow
oocyte and sperm donation. Consequently, Italian couples are
able to seek treatments that are not allowed in Italy by travel-
ling to other EU countries, circumventing the prohibition by
resorting to so-called ‘reproductive tourism’ (Pennings,
2004). That European couples living in countries with more
restrictive regulations have sought MAR treatments in more
liberal countries has been documented (Baetens et al., 2000;
Vandervorst et al., 2000; Pennings, 2001). It is very likely
that the extremely restrictive Italian law will force couples
increasingly to seek treatment for infertility in foreign
countries. Although reproductive tourism may be seen as an
opportunity to enjoy moral pluralism (Pennings, 2004), it
raises domestic issues of inequality of access to heath care,
which is covered by public health insurance and thus accessi-
ble to all citizens. Besides the moral issue, reproductive tour-
ism raises also constitutional issues. The constitutional rights
to health care and to equal protection (Italian Constitution,
1947, Art.3 and 29) are jeopardized if access to some medi-
cal treatments for infertility depends upon the economic
Human Reproduction Vol.20, No.5 pp. 1153–1157, 2005 doi:10.1093/humrep/deh871
Advance Access publication March 24, 2005
q The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oupjournals.org
1153
means of infertile couples and their ability to secure those
treatments in a foreign country.
Finally, surrogate motherhood is prohibited. Consequently,
all surrogate mother contracts, which require the surrogate
mother to consent to third party adoption of the child follow-
ing birth and to facilitate the transfer of child custody, are
null under the Italian Civil Code (1942, art.1325), because
the law views them as being against public policy.
Cryopreservation and transfer of embryos
Cryopreservation of the sperm and oocytes is permissible if
required by any of the procedures. On the other hand, the
general rule is that cryopreservation of embryos is forbidden.
In fact, ‘no fertilization procedure can produce embryos in
excess of three, and that all fertilized pre-embryos must be
implanted simultaneously’ (Law 40/2004, Art.14, sec.2,
emphasis added).
The number of oocytes that can be fertilized is limited to
three, and none of them can be transferred at a later time.
Freezing embryos is therefore prohibited under normal cir-
cumstances, and if the first attempt to implant the fertilized
embryos is unsuccessful, the patient will have to undertake a
second hormone-based treatment to stimulate ovulation. If
the first implantation fails, the mother-to-be may have to
undertake repeated hormonal treatment and laparoscopies,
thus imposing an undue burden on their health. Moreover,
‘[m]any centres report a reduction in the success rates for
women aged .35 years and a steep increase in multiple
pregnancies in those aged ,35 years, who are often
implanted with three embryos’ (Turone, 2004).
Cryopreservation is allowed only under exceptional cir-
cumstances such as unforeseeable health conditions of the
woman, making transfer of embryo(s) impossible. Thus,
implantation may be delayed if the woman’s severe and
documented medical conditions could affect the outcome of
the fertilization process. One can only speculate on which
circumstances would justify a delay in the procedure. Italian
policymakers clearly intended to permit deviations from the
general rule—no general recourse to cryopreservation
techniques—only under exceptional circumstances such as
serious medical conditions that render physical transfer of the
embryo impossible. A severe physical injury due to a car
accident is likely to justify embryo cryopreservation.
In contrast with the principles of Law 40/2004 as enacted
by the Parliament, the Ministry of Health Guidelines provide
that the transfer of embryos cannot be imposed upon patients.
This provision is in contrast with the rule imposing the trans-
fer of all embryos unless the unforeseeable health conditions
prevent a successful embryo transfer. However, the Guide-
lines prevent physicians from coercing women to be subject
to non-voluntary implantations. This rule seems consistent
with the voluntary nature of the procedure. Therefore, cryo-
preservation may be once again necessary as a practical mat-
ter. However, the legal framework does not regulate in detail
when cryopreservation is required. The Guidelines simply
state that the fertilized embryos must be cryopreserved for
the shortest time possible and ‘until its extinguishing’ (Italian
Ministry of Health, 2004). The language is unclear and
Italian policymakers must provide further guidance.
The Guidelines also provide for the frozen embryos that
existed at the time the law was enacted. To deal with this
issue, all institutions that produced embryos before February
2004 must advise the Ministry of Health of the number of
embryos that had been produced and disclose the personal
information of the couples who had resorted to MAR (Law
40/2004, Art.17, sec.2). Furthermore, the Guidelines dis-
tinguish between embryos that are likely to be implanted and
‘abandoned’ embryos, i.e. embryos that have not been
claimed back by the requesting couple or that have been pro-
duced at the request of women who are not ‘of potentially
fertile age’ (Italian Ministry of Health, 2004). While the
same institutions shall keep those embryos that had been pro-
duced and that are likely to be implanted in the future, the
Guidelines provide that ‘abandoned’ embryos will all be
gathered in a central repository located in Milan. Govern-
mental sources report that these embryos number 24 000
(De Bac, 2004).
Finally, it is noteworthy that both private and public hospi-
tals may treat couples. As a general principle, if the treatment
occurs in a public hospital, the national health care system
bears the costs relating to the treatment. Both private and
public fertility clinics may treat infertile patients only if
listed in an ad hoc registry compiled by the Ministry of
Health. This branch of the Italian Government may thus auth-
orize institutions interested in performing MAR and monitor
their operations after the authorization occurs.
Preimplantation testing
Preimplantation genetic testing is permissible; however, the
law forbids selecting the embryos to be implanted or ‘altering
the genetic patrimony of an embryo or a gamete’, only allow-
ing genetic counselling to couples if ‘severe and irreversible
abnormalities’ are detected (Law 40/2004, Art.13, sec.3).
Consequently, all embryos that survive the fertilization stage
must be implanted (Law 40/2004, Art.14, sec.2).
This provision raises issues of health for both women and
newborns. The limitations on preimplantation testing have
rapidly reached Italian courts (Turone, 2004). In May 2004, a
trial judge denied the request of a married couple in which
the woman was the carrier of the thalassaemia gene to have
the embryos-to-be-implanted tested for thalassaemia and to
prevent implantations of the embryos that would eventually
result positive. The judge reasoned that, under the circum-
stances, preimplantation testing would be equal to ‘an abor-
tion as procedure to select foetuses based on their health
conditions . . . [thus resulting in] a eugenic utilization of abor-
tion, which the law [on abortion] expressly forbids’ (Trial
Court of Catania, 2004).
The law also presents a legal paradox. As a practical mat-
ter, under the current law, the treating physician is required
to implant all embryos unless a therapeutic abortion is per-
missible. Under the rules governing therapeutic abortion
(Law 22 May 1978, n.194, art.4, 6), which permit this kind
of abortion if the pregnancy imposes a ‘severe risk’ on
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the woman’s health, the treating physician may avoid
implanting the fertilized embryos in the woman’s womb if
the transfer imposes a ‘severe risk’ on her health. The health
of the patient rather than the potential dysfunction of the
embryo determines the physician’s decision. Moreover, once
informed of genetic disease that will potentially affect the
newborn, the parents may choose to have an abortion after
the implantation. The requirement to impose on all embryos
a regime of legalized abortion is illogical from a policy and
ethical perspective, and medically inefficient. One way
around the legal paradox is offered by the fact that the law
does not sanction women who refuse the transfer of embryos.
As a practical matter, this gap gives women some discretion
to decline the transfer of embryos who tested positively for
genetic diseases (Flamigni, 2004).
Eligibility
Under Italian law, infertility is required to be treated. These
techniques shall be used to solve ‘reproductive problems
caused by sterility or human infertility’ (Law 40/2004,
Art.1). The Ministry of Health Guidelines provide that,
although distinguishable, in the end, sterility and infertility
are synonyms, and that ‘sterility’ should be construed as ‘the
absence of conception after 12/24 months of regular, unpro-
tected sexual intercourse, besides the cases of a known path-
ology’ (Italian Ministry of Health, 2004). Moreover, MAR is
accessible only if all alternative treatments for infertility are
not effective, which is certified by the treating physician.
Thus, infertile couples have access to MAR only if it is prop-
erly documented and certified by the treating physician that
the causes of infertility may not be clinically removed
(Italian Ministry of Health, 2004).
Heterosexual couples—whether married or living
together—in which both persons are aged $18 years and of
potentially fertile age have access to MAR treatment (Law
40/2004, Art.5). Homosexual couples, minors and singles,
i.e. individuals who are not in a heterosexual relationship,
cannot access MAR procedures. Also post-menopausal
women cannot undergo MAR treatment. In fact, the Ministry
of Health Guidelines require that embryos that have been
produced at the request of women who are not ‘of potentially
fertile age’ shall not be implanted but rather collected in a
central repository (this provision will be discussed later)
(Italian Ministry of Health, 2004). Finally, all couples who
are not infertile but are carriers of genetic diseases may not
access MAR. On the other hand, a couple in a de facto
relationship qualifies for treatment. However, the Parliament
avoids defining in detail what a de facto relationship is,
specifying only that it occurs whenever a man and a woman
live together.
Both parents-to-be must be alive at the time the treatment
for MAR begins. However, if the man’s death occurs
between the time of fertilization and implantation, the pro-
cess is not interrupted and all fertilized embryos must be
transferred to the woman’s womb.
The eligibility provisions raise several constitutional issues
of inequality of access. Under the Italian Constitution, ‘all
citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the
law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion,
political opinion, personal and social conditions.’ (Italian
Constitution, Art.3). Moreover, the Constitutional Court may
declare the law unconstitutional as being against the freedom
of reproduction (Italian Constitution, Art.2, 29 and 31) and
the freedom of self-determination (Italian Constitution,
Art.13) if the Court finds that the law unreasonably limits the
possibility of determination in reproductive choices of people
who are in a relationship but do not live together, to single
women, homosexuals, carriers of genetic diseases, etc.
Legal status and rights of the newborn
The law provides the same rights to children who are born
under MAR techniques as to children who are conceived
naturally (Law 40/2004, Art.8). Interestingly, the law
addresses illegal fertilizations, for instance if the conceiving
woman receives an illegal oocyte donation. In this scenario,
paternal rights belong to the mother’s spouse rather than the
natural father. Thus, the mother’s spouse or partner who is
the recipient of an illegal sperm or oocyte donation cannot
exercise his right to refuse paternity, and the donor does not
bear any legal relationship with the newborn and is neither
entitled to paternal rights nor bears any obligation. Finally,
contrary to the case of natural or sexual procreation, the
mother cannot remain anonymous to the child.
Medical research on human embryos
Medical research on human embryos is forbidden (Law
40/2004, Art.13). In fact, Italian law prohibits any manipu-
lation or usage of the early human embryo other than for the
purpose of bringing about its implantation into the uterus of
the woman who produced the oocyte. Therefore, in the
absence of alternative procedures, clinical research may be
conducted only in the interest of the health and development
of the embryo and with therapeutic and diagnostic aims. In
other words, research and experimentation on embryos is
allowed only within the context of clinical treatments.
Reproductive cloning, i.e. a ‘procedure aimed to obtain a
human being from one cell, possibly identical, in terms of
genetic patrimony, to a different human being whether dead
or alive,’ is forbidden (Law 40/2004, Art.10, sec.7). More
specifically, the new regulations explicitly forbid:
. creating human embryos for the purpose of doing
research or experimenting on them;
. all forms of eugenic selection, including procedures that
would manipulate or somehow artificially alter the genetic
patrimony or predetermine genetic traits of the embryo or
gamete;
. cloning by transferring the nucleus, by early scission of
the embryo or by ectogenesis; and,
. fertilizing a human embryo with the gamete of a living
entity of a different species.
Unfortunately, neither the law nor Guidelines define
‘embryo’. Contrary to Germany (Deutscher Bundestag, 1990)
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and Switzerland (Assemble´e fe´de´rale de la Confe´de´ration
suisse, 1998, Art.2), Italian lawmakers avoided taking a pos-
ition on whether an ‘embryo’ exists from fertilization (sperm
penetration into the oocyte) or syngamy (fusion of the
maternal and paternal pronuclei). Although banning research
on embryos, both the German and Swiss laws allow the cryo-
preservation of an oocyte after penetration by sperm but
before a zygote is formed (ootid). Italian practitioners have
already pointed out the problems left open by the normative
gap. Recently, Carlo Flamigni, a medical expert in MAR
techniques and a member of the National Bioethics Commit-
tee, announced his provocative intention to admit to the
Bologna authorities that he froze an ootid. ‘Maybe I’ll be
arrested . . . but maybe the judge will decide that, according
to the law, the ootid and even the zygote can be frozen, since
neither was cited in the law’, Flamigni added (Turone, 2004).
From a practical point of view, the ambiguity of the legal
notion of ‘embryos’ could be used to circumvent the ban on
the selection of embryos to be implanted to the advantage of
couples who carry genes for monogenic diseases. In fact,
conducting genetic screening of the ootids before syngamy is
not expressly outlawed. However, there is need for legal cer-
tainty in this area to provide clear guidance to practitioners
on the delicate issues of whether individual human life
begins with the formation of the unique genome after the
diploid chromosome set has been formed from parental
DNA.
The sanction for illegal reproductive cloning is jail time
ranging from 10 to 20 years. Finally, all experiments on
embryos, i.e. including genetic cloning, eugenic procedures,
and mixing human genes with genes from other species are
criminally punished under the new law.
The role of physicians and the patient/physicians
relationship
Treating physicians play a substantial role in the recently
enacted legal regime. First, treating physicians decide
whether or not the requirements to access MAR techniques
are met and which treatment better suits a couple’s medical
conditions. They also certify that the couple is a ‘de facto’
couple, thus entitling them to being treated. Second, treating
physicians shall provide counselling to the couple if abnorm-
alities are detected in the preimplantation stage. Third, treat-
ing physicians can exercise some discretion in filling up all
those legislative gaps that Italian policymakers have not
addressed. In fact, treating physicians may test the ootids for
monogenic diseases, inform the patients of the tests’ out-
comes, and, if the couples so wish, interrupt the treatment or
favour the syngamy of the ootids that are not carriers of gen-
etic diseases. The law assigns no role to Ethics Committees
or similar institutional, advisory bodies that may facilitate
physicians discharging their duties. On the other hand, treat-
ing physicians and the people who assist them in performing
illegal procedures may be criminally and civilly sanctioned.
In fact, violators may be punished with either monetary fines
or, in fewer yet more substantial violations, incarceration.
Among the criminally sanctioned procedures, the law lists
utilizing a gamete with the purpose of performing an illegal
fertilization, marketing gametes, treating same-sex couples,
single women, and couples in which at least one partner is a
minor. Finally, treating couples without obtaining prior con-
sent to the MAR in medical institutions that are not listed in
the ad hoc registry compiled by the Ministry of Health is
civilly and criminally punishable.
Both the mother-to-be and father-to-be must provide
informed consent to the treatment in writing $7 days prior
to beginning the fertilization process. Both may withdraw
consent at a later time up until the oocyte is fertilized. With-
drawal of consent is thus time sensitive: once fertilization
occurs, the process is irreversible. This provision has raised
concerns among policymakers—mostly from the left-wing
coalition—claiming that a lack of flexibility imposes a bur-
densome limitation on the woman’s right to choose whether
or not to have a pregnancy. In fact, although unexpected
events such as the death of a partner may happen between
the time of fertilization and implantation, they cannot stop
the process, even if the woman has changed her mind and no
longer wants to proceed with the treatment. The law punishes
physicians who treat couples without obtaining their
informed consent prior to treatment. Interestingly, the
patients of illegal treatments are never punished under the
law unless they engage in marketing oocytes, sperm or
embryos, or participate in reproductive cloning.
Physicians and their assistants may object to MAR based
on moral beliefs. In objecting, they must give notice of this
to the medical institutions where they perform medical ser-
vices. At any rate, they may revoke their statements of con-
scious objection at any time; however, their revocation will
only be effective for 30 days after it is made.
The ethical and political debate
To many foreign observers, Italian politics are often unintelli-
gible. The political debate surrounding the enactment of the
new law regulating MAR is no exception to the general rule.
The final text of the law was approved by the Parliament
after lengthy discussion within the legislative arena and mass
media. Over the years, different bills were proposed for
approval, and the Parliament eventually approved a draft that
combines some of the proposals. The government, led by
Mr Berlusconi, was able to overcome the dichotomy within
society on several ethical and social issues. In fact, the con-
servative majority was able to attract the votes of Parlia-
ment’s Catholic members in enacting a conservative law on
MAR and in vitro research on embryos. The vote on the
MAR law united openly Catholic members of Parliament,
creating what is called, in the jargon of Italian politics, a
‘transversal party.’ The Senate approved in second reading
the final draft of the law with a majority of 169 members (92
members were opposed and five members abstained). The
view of a ‘transversal party’ is generally supported by the
consideration that many provisions are perfectly aligned with
the view held by the Roman Catholic community and the
Vatican in particular. The Vatican reportedly informally
endorses the Italian Parliament’s narrow legalization of
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certain forms of MAR. Under the Vatican’s view, IVF and
reproductive cloning are both ‘terrible aberrations to which
value-free science is driven and is a sign of the profound
malaise of our civilization, which looks to science, technol-
ogy and the ‘quality of life’ as surrogates for the meaning of
life and its salvation’ (Pontificia Academia Pro Vita, 1997).
Moreover, the law is also the outcome of political bargain-
ing between Catholics and the liberal members of Parliament
who wanted certain forms of MAR, such as IVF and artificial
insemination, legalized. In fact, the law affirms that medi-
cally assisted conception in itself is not unethical, but that
certain forms must be prohibited. Procreation is thus moral
even though disconnected with sexual activity, a principle in
contrast with the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.
Furthermore, although denying singles and homosexual
couples access to MAR techniques, the law does not limit
access to IVF to married couples, recognizing de facto
relationships.
It is also interesting to note the division between the mem-
bers of the Italian National Bioethics Committee. The Com-
mittee Chairman and one of its Catholic members publicly
endorsed the new regulations on several occasions. On the
other hand, six Committee members—along with a group of
intellectuals—signed a harsh letter expressing great concern
about the recently enacted law. The signatories of the letter
view the new regulations as ‘a radical attack to civil growth
in [Italy] . . . [which] imposes bans and harsh limitations pro-
viding for sanctions often inspired by a senseless view of
punishment’. Most of all, the letter argues that the law
breaches the constitutional principle of separation between
church and state—an argument often endorsed by other com-
mentators in the public debate (Levi Montalcini et al., 2003).
Conclusion
The new Italian law on MAR regulates a field of medical
practice and research that has been non-regulated for years.
The Parliament conservatively prohibits treatments such as
oocyte donation and sperm donation that are legal in several
other modern democracies. Furthermore, the law prohibits
the more controversial reproductive cloning and research on
embryos. The new provisions have raised, rather than solved,
the debate over complex and difficult issues. In the coming
months and years the medical community will implement
those principles in its daily practice. It is very likely that
some of the provisions will be circumvented in daily prac-
tice. If the effectiveness of the new law becomes an issue of
implementation and of conscience for those physicians who
are asked to make decisions in the isolation of their labora-
tories, the future of the law will be uncertain. In 2005, a pub-
lic referendum on several key provisions of the law will
likely take place. Although the Constitutional Court did not
admit that the referendum seeks the entire repeal of the MAR
law, it admitted four referenda that seek to repeal: (i) the
restrictions on embryonic stem cell research; (ii) the require-
ment not to fertilize more than three embryos per treatment;
(iii) the requirement that embryo transfer must be mandatory;
and finally (iv) the ban on oocyte and sperm donation. Per-
haps the Constitutional Court’s appro val of the referendum
on these four questions is a good opportunity for the Parlia-
ment to re-open the debate on solving some of the contradic-
tions and gaps that this article has highlighted, and to
accommodate more liberal views on this controversial yet
crucial issue.
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